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RESUMEN
La sexualidad victoriana a menudo ha sido considerada como paradigma de templanza y
castidad, como reflejo de un periodo en que se enfatizaba el control de la sexualidad y del
cuerpo de la mujer como medio para mantener y asegurar el control social y cultural. Sin
embargo, esta conceptualización modernista del periodo victoriano gradualmente se aban-
donó cuando historiadoras y teóricas de mediados del siglo veinte miraron hacia el pasado
con el afán de recuperar la complejidad de un periodo de contrastes que predicaba la ética
de la modestia y la virtuosidad, mientras la población aumentaba de forma alarmante. El
objetivo de este artículo consiste en revisar las presunciones acerca de las sexualidades
victorianas a través de los trabajos y las ideas de Annie Besant acerca de las políticas del
matrimonio con el fin de esclarecer concepciones contemporáneas neo-victorianas, restau-
rando así la posición de Besant como figura canónica dentro del feminismo victoriano de
finales de siglo diecinueve.
PALABRAS CLAVE: Annie Besant, sexualidad/es victorianas, matrimonio, piedad, autoayuda.
ABSTRACT
Victorian sexuality has often been regarded as the epitome of prudery and chastity, as a
reflection of a period which placed great emphasis on the control of sexuality and women’s
body as way to maintain and ensure social and cultural control. Nonetheless, this modern-
ist conceptualisation was gradually left behind when mid-twentieth century historians and
theorists looked back to the past to recover the complexity of a period of contrasts which
both preached the ethics of prudery and virtuosity, while the overwhelming increase of
population remained a plain fact. The aim of this essay is to reassess assumptions of Victo-
rian sexualities through Annie Besant’s works and ideas as regards marriage policies in an
attempt to shed light over contemporary Neo-Victorian conceptions of sexualities, thus
restoring Besant’s position as a canonical figure at the end of nineteenth-century Victorian
feminism.
KEY WORDS: Annie Besant, Victorian sexuality/ies, marriage, piety, self-help.
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REINTERPRETING VICTORIAN
ASSUMPTIONS OF SEXUALITY
The term “Victorian” has often been associated with rigorous moralism
and sexual repression mainly as a result of Lytton Strachey’s seminal work Eminent
Victorians published in 1918. According to Eli Adams (2005), this image of Victo-
rian sexuality has often been entertained because it provided the basis for proclaim-
ing the modernist and contemporary subsequent liberation and enlightenment as
opposed to the repression and constraint that presumably characterised the imme-
diately previous age. Nonetheless, well into the twentieth-century, this vision of
Victorian prudery was subverted and challenged on two main fronts. Firstly, archi-
val research contributed to a more thorough knowledge of Victorian private lives
and public discussion on these commonly assumed lives of prudery and virtuosity.
A seminal volume like Steven Marcus’ The Other Victorians (1966), drew attention
to a remarkable contemporary wishful thinking about the Victorians. Secondly,
later on, Michel Foucault’s The History of Sexuality (1978) arose as a more radical
questioning of the received views about Victorian sexualities, interpreting them as
discourses of power and knowledge, of control and regulation, thus merging them
within broader social, economic, and cultural ideas that both shaped and reflected
the construction of Victorian ideas about sexualities. In this respect, Eli Adams
contends that «the very concept of ‘sexuality’ [...] is a nineteenth-century invention
which took shape when the traditional moral agency of the priest was subsumed
and transformed by developing discourses»1 pertaining to all disciplines of knowl-
edge which emerged and intermingled, thus attesting the multifaceted nature of the
Victorian period as a reflection of the conception of society both as an organic and
compartmentalised body at the same time.
In relation to modernist and contemporary assumptions about Victorian
constructions of sexuality, Sheila Jeffreys (1982) refers to often perceived notions of
historians on the evolution of sexuality such as the assumption that the last one
hundred years represent a story of progress from the darkness of Victorian prudery
to the light of sexual freedom, while sexuality played an important role as a way of
regulation in Victorian England2. Secondly, Jeffreys also considers the assumption
there is an essence of sexuality which turns out to be unquestionably heterosexual,
when homosexuality and other forms of sexuality coexisted with heterosexual con-
structions. Moreover, historians also tend to take for granted there is a unity of
interests between men and women in the area of sexuality, while it was clear that
women’s interests were subjected to those of men. Finally, a most fundamental as-
sumption about sexuality according to Jeffreys is that sexuality was conceived as
1 J.E. ADAMS, «Victorian Sexualities», in H.F. TUCKER (ed.), Victorian Literature and Culture,
London, Blackwell, 2005, pp. 125-138, 126.
2 S. JEFFREYS, «‘Free From All Uninvited Touch of Man’: Women’s Campaigns Around
Sexuality, 1880-1914». Women’s Studies International Forum, vol. 5, núm. 6 (1982), pp. 629-645.
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private and personal, when manuals pertaining to different disciplines and conduct
books proliferated throughout the period.
1. SEXUALITIES WITHIN VICTORIAN ECONOMIC,
SOCIAL AND ETHICAL FRAMEWORKS
The origins of Victorian attitudes toward sexuality should be rooted in the
late eighteenth-century religious revival known as the Evangelical movement under
the leadership of William Wilberforce in an attempt to transform British politics by
reinvigorating Christian piety and interpreting human life as a permanent moral
struggle of resistance to desire and temptation. In the nineteenth-century, sex be-
came the subject of a range of disciplines to be tackled in larger economic and
political subjects. As Eli Adams points out, economic tropes were often used in
order to discuss sexualities, understanding sex as a vital force to be carefully regu-
lated, with perilous consequences awaiting those who proved too extravagant3. The
close relationship between homo sexualis and homo economicus betrays the Victorian
faith in the capital power of will and self-help, relying on duty and labour, and
willing to defer present gratification for later reward.
In this respect, Evangelical ethos gradually moved to secular uses within the
political and economic domains to the extent Karl Marx alluded to «the science of
renunciation». It was also at this stage that Malthus placed sexuality at the very core
of his socioeconomic deliberations with his Essay on the Principle of Population (1798),
contending that human reproduction exceeded advances in food supply. Despite
the fact his work shocked many conservative commentators, Malthus, as an Angli-
can clergyman, believed sex was intended solely for reproduction, and thus, he
chose to refuse any claim to contraception, defending moral restraint instead. Like-
wise, William Godwin’s Political Justice (1793) also envisioned an antisensual progress
of civilisation, outstripping humanity of sexual desire and imagining reproduction
as a social duty subjected to rational regulation. Similar ideas became widespread in
Mary Wollstonecraft’s A Vindication for the Rights of Woman (1792), which claimed
that the education of women solely for marriage rendered them mere animals, and
John Stuart Mill’s On the Subjection of Women (1869), which contended no great
improvement in human life could be effected as long as the animal instinct of sex
occupied such a disproportionate place in society. Thus, despite the will of reform
spread in these works, self-restraint still excelled as a basis to claim moral authority
for the middle-classes, ultimately finding its epitome within the Victorian concep-
tion of the home as a shelter from public life, and the domestic figure of the angel of
the house, preached by John Ruskin and Coventry Patmore, as an idealised patriar-
chal vision of the Victorian middle-class woman.
3 ADAMS, op. cit., p. 127.
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Nevertheless, this idyllic conception of the Victorian woman coexisted with
the medical belief of women’s powerful, sexual, and therefore, destructive if unre-
strained, nature as the uterus was considered the centre of the anatomical web that
shaped the female body4. The angel of the house was pervaded with the arising
presence of the new woman, often conceived as an euphemism to refer to the fallen
woman. Nonetheless, as Eli Adams argues, what we now know about the rich sen-
suality of many Victorian marriages and lives makes this peculiar ideal seem all the
stranger to present-day Victorianists5. Thus, the pulsion between dignity and de-
sire, and the collision between morality and sexuality often culminated in Victorian
asceticism whereby, on the one hand, sexual instincts were hard to reconcile with
the demands of culture, and on the other hand, capitalist ethics of consumption
also predated the most intimate intricacies of sexual life, thus undermining the
persistent belief in the separation of spheres between a private and a public exist-
ence. In this respect, the separation and confluence of spheres bears also reflection
on the Victorian conception of the body as marking the border of two worlds sepa-
rated through skin, which allowed the passage of substances into and out of the
body through its permeability, while at the same time clothed and covered the body,
rendering it a separate entity from the surrounding environment6. Due to these
conceptions of the Victorian body as both unity and integrity, and as a microcosm
of the well-structured social body, the sexual act was often perceived as a crisis in the
integrity of the body. This dislocation of integrity was specifically true in the case of
women as, within the middle-class ethos, it was believed that women became differ-
ent after marriage, adding to their legal and social change in status, an inherent
transformation of their bodies.
Consequently, while repression was often subtly eroticised in Victorian novels
with angel-of-the-house heroines presenting secondary fallen women characters as
projections of themselves, mid-Victorian culture became entangled with the uses of
pleasure as a result of a shifting focus of economic theory from production to con-
sumption, bearing in mind women made up most of the readership. Moreover, in
medical manuals, such as George Drysdale’s The Elements of Social Science (1855),
the issue of contraception was often tackled, marking the decline in middle-class
family size towards the decade of the 1860s. Consequently, the Victorian concern
about sexuality from the perspective of different discourses, together with the coex-
istence of often contradictory and opposed ideas about conceiving and understand-
ing sexualities, rather betrays a contemporary anxiety of our powerfully divided
understanding of sexuality which is projected onto Victorian conceptualisations.
4 L. ROTHFIELD, «Medical», in H.F.TUCKER (ed.), Victorian Literature and Culture, London,
Blackwell, 2005, pp. 170-182, 177.
5 ADAMS, op. cit., p.129.
6 H. MICHIE, «Under Victorian skins: The bodies beneath», in H.F.TUCKER (ed.), Victorian
Literature and Culture, London, Blackwell, 2005, pp. 407-424, 408.
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2. THE AWKWARD POSITION
OF ANNIE BESANT
Despite the ethics of meekness and the cult of true womanhood within the
context of Victorian England, during the decades of the 1880s and 1890s, women
became visible as never before. Activists like Josephine Butler, Florence Fenwick
Miller, Frances Power Cobbe, Clementina Black, and Annie Besant raised their
voices, shaping public discussion and political policy on a wide range of issues.
Women’s rights advanced substantially to the extent a number of different legal
reforms were effected. Women’s property rights culminated in the «Married Women’s
Property Act» of 1882, the «Contagious Diseases Acts» of the 1860s were repealed,
and different moves toward suffrage began to gain some ground. Moreover, the
1870 «Education Act» enabled women to stand for election to school boards. In
1888, women gained the vote in municipal and county elections, and in 1894 the
«Local Government Act» established no person should be disqualified by sex or
marriage from being elected to district or parish councils. Nevertheless, women
were still barred from voting in national elections in spite of the introduction of full
suffrage bills into Parliament during the 1890s, and female students did not receive
degrees from Cambridge or Oxford until well into the twentieth-century.
These isolated, though significant, efforts to advance women’s rights arose
within a larger political concern to reform and redress the social framework of the
time. Within this context, Annie Besant became an active agent for change across a
range of causes7. A former devoted wife to an Anglican minister, Besant renounced
both marriage and faith in 1873 to become a leading figure in the National Secular
Society; the Malthusian Society, which advocated birth control; and the socialist
Fabian Society. Meanwhile, she also became a frequent contributor to the radical
paper National Reformer, a co-founder of the Freethought Publishing Company,
and a captivating public speaker. In the 1880s, Besant turned toward socialist and
labor causes, earning fame from the role she played in the Bryant and May match-
girl strike in 1888, which focused public attention on the industry’s precarious
working conditions and unfair wages, underlining the outstanding political fer-
ment that characterised the last decades of nineteenth-century England.
Late Victorians often disentangled the public from the private as a key fea-
ture characterising the Victorian fin-de-siècle to be often dismissed by their immedi-
ate modernist sucessors. In this respect, Annie Besant brought the private sphere
into the public domain writing on a diverse range of topics such as marriage, private
property, population control, land reform, socialism, prostitution, art, imperialism,
labour, religion, and political equality. Nevertheless, as Arata (2005) mentions, none
of her works are widely read any longer by literature students8, wondering whether
7 J. SAVILLE (ed.), A Selection of the Social and Political Pamphlets of Annie Besant. New York,
Augustus Kelly, 1970.
8 S. ARATA, «1897», in H.F. TUCKER (ed.), Victorian Literature and Culture, London, Blackwell,
2005, pp. 51-65, 63.
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the continued enthrallment to modernist critical standards is still to blame for such
a neglect. Actually, despite her numerous output of volumes tackling women’s situ-
ation at the fin-de-siècle, such as The Political Status of Women (1874), The Law of
Population (1877), or Marriage As It Was, As It Is, and As It Should Be: A Plea for
Reform (1878), her essays and autobiographies are still excluded from the canon,
critics have often overshadowed her from the Victorian sage writing, and the non-
availability of some editions confirm her still somehow precarious situation in con-
temporary studies. Having abandoned her clergyman husband to preach freethought
and feminism, her final conversion to teosophy and her ultimate plea for celibacy as
a consequence may have played a major role in her marginalisation both in Victo-
rian social and feminist writings9. Consequently, her exclusion in Victorian times
due to her transgressive behaviour also echoes her canonical exclusion in modernist
and often contemporary syllabus. Moreover, her life as depicted in her autobiogra-
phy is not exempt from contradictions. Actually, it was through her marriage and
the opressive situation she experienced that Besant felt the need to free herself and
denounce women’s submission in marriage, becoming a public lecturer and playing
an active role in the public sphere, although she was often overshadowed by much
more numerous male public figures such as Edward Pusey, Charles Voysey, Thomas
Scott, Edward Aveling, or Charles Bradlaugh.
As an active member of the National Secular Society and a public orator in
the Hall of Science, Besant met Charles Bradlaugh to begin a fruitful and challeng-
ing professional companionship. One of her utmost achievements was the pam-
phlet The Legalisation of Female Slavey in England, issued in 1885 and originally
published in the National Reformer in 1876, as a contribution to the campaign to
repeal the «Contagious Diseases Act» (1885). This pamphlet questioned the myth
of feminine chastity as well as the duality of Victorian sexual values. Within a con-
text of social purity endeavours, Besant’s work was unique as she fought for sexual
rights for women and included contraceptive information in the new editions of
The Law of Population (1877), often banned through the «Obscene Publication
Act» (1857), and in the preface she wrote together with Charles Bradlaugh of Charles
Knowlton’s Fruits of Philosophy, which led to the 1877 famous trial10. Besant and
Bradlaugh tried to fight for the right of free publication and raised the issue of
contemporary ideology defending male control over women’s sexuality as a social
danger. Gradually, Besant perceived gender differences were a justification for the
inequality between women and men, pointing out that women’s oppression was
not founded on biological principles, but on culturally-constructed notions. This
permanent process of cross-examination, shifting identities, and looking into her
private life in order to prove her social and feminist ideas led her conversion to
9 A. BESANT, Autobiographical Sketckes.1885; A. BESANT, «Why I Became a Teosophist».
1889; A. BESANT, An Autobiography. 1893.
10 R. MANWELL, The Trial of Annie Besant and Charles Bradlaugh. London, Elek/Pemberton,
1976.
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teosophy11. From Evangelism to Freethought and Fabianism up until her teosophical
phase, Besant undwerwent different changes. However, it has often been agreed the
turning-point of her career as a woman and as a thinker was her marriage and her
resulting volume Marriage As It Was, As It Is and As It Should Be (1878).
3. ANNIE BESANT’S RITE OF PASSAGE:
MARRIAGE AND AWAKENING
In 1877, Annie Besant and her associate, Charles Bradlaugh, were arrested
and tried for testing their legal right to publish the American birth-control cam-
paigner Charles Knowlton’s The Fruits of Philosophy12 under English jurisdiction.
The book was allegedly despised as indecent and obscene for advocating family
planning and birth-rate control. As a result, Besant was deprived of the custody of
her daughter after separating from her husband. Subsequently, Besant declared she
considered the book as an imperfect one, and ceased to advertise it in order to
publish her own volume The Law of Population: Its Consequences, and Its Bearing
upon Human Conduct and Morals in the same year. Through the publication of
both books, Besant advocated the need of birth control and family planning as a
result of the overwhelming increase of population of the time. Different methods of
contraception were presented and advised to both men and women in their mar-
riage, which especially granted women a higher degree of freedom and indepen-
dence. As Winnifred Harper Cooley states, the New Woman was characterised by
her capacity «to decide herself if, when and whom she wants to marry and how
many children she wants to have»13.
Besant belonged to a family of high position and received an excellent edu-
cation. She travelled all through Europe and learnt French, German and Italian.
Once she returned to England, at the age of twenty, she married a clergyman of the
English Church and became fond of theological issues. Gradually, her views dif-
fered significantly from those of her husband, and they legally separated after six
years of marriage and the birth of their two children, Digby and Mabel. From then
onwards, she began to write for different periodicals and delivered numerous lec-
tures. In 1874, she published her first book The Political Status of Women, where she
started to ascertain her consciousness as a woman once many changes, at different
levels, had taken place in her own life. According to Chandrasekhar, «Besant later
wrote that after marriage, she and her husband discovered their profound ignorance
11 A.H. NETHERCOT, The First Five Lives of Annie Besant. London, Rupert Hart-Davis,
1961.
12 Ch. KNOWLTON, The Fruits of Philosophy: An Essay on the Population. London, Freethought
Publishing Company, 1877.
13 W. HARPER COOLEY, The New Womanhood. New York, Broadway Publishing Company,
1904, p. 31.
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of sex»14, which made her very aware of the need for sex education and the politics
of sexuality of married couples.
3.1. GENDERED RIGHTS
In 1878, once she had separated from her husband and had had a daughter,
Annie Besant wrote her second book Marriage: as it was, as it is and as it should be,
through which she strongly defended the need for a marriage reform. In the very
first lines of this book, Besant states that «the recognition of human rights may be
said to be of modern growth, and even yet they are but imperfectly understood»15,
since «the Rights of Man have become an accepted doctrine, but, unfortunately,
they are only rights of man, in the exclusive sense of the word»16. Besant argues that
these kinds of rights are sexual, and not human, that is, they are deeply determined
by sex. The fact of denying these rights to women is the same as denying them to
humanity or rejecting women are part of humanity.
Nevertheless, Besant argues that «the difference between men and women
in all civil rights, is, however, with few, although important, exceptions, confined to
married women; i.e. women in relation with men»17. According to Besant, unmar-
ried women are significantly liberated in comparison with their married counter-
parts, since it is actually marriage «which brings with it the weight of injustice and
of legal degradation»18. In former times, at the dawn of humanity, marriage was
conceived as «a matter of force, fraud or purchase»19, in other words, women were
considered merchandise from whom their male relatives could profit. Once women
were married, they became the possession of the men they married. As Besant por-
trays, «in the old Hebrew books [...] the wife is regarded as the property of her
husband»20. Moreover, the author also makes references to the way marriage cer-
emonies are enacted in tribes from other nations, stating that «amongst many semi-
barbarous nations the wives are still bought»21.
Besant also refers to the evolution of marriage from the old Roman laws up
until her present-day times. She states that «by the old Roman laws, the married
woman had no personal rights»22 and, during the feudal system, it was the lord
14 S. CHANDRASEKHAR, A Dirty, Filthy Book: The Writings of Charles Knowlton and Annie
Besant on Reproductive Physiology and Birth Control and An Account of the Bradlaugh-Besant Trial.
London, University of California Press, 1981, p. 31.
15 A. BESANT, Marriage, As It Was, As It Is, and As It Should Be: A Plea for Reform, New York,
A.K.Butts, 1878, p. 3.
16 Ibidem, p. 4.
17 Ibidem, p. 5.
18 Ibidem.
19 Ibidem, p. 6.
20 Ibidem, p. 5.
21 Ibidem, p. 6.
22 Ibidem, p. 7.
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ensured the fields and properties descended in the male line, thus perpetuating the
subjection of women. Besant states, in that respect, that «the pity is that English
gentlemen to-day are content to allow the law to remain unaltered, when the whole
face of society has changed»23. Moreover, Besant also makes reference to the Old
and New Testament, stating that while the Old Testament sanctioned polygamy,
the «ecclesiastical Christianity has generally been in favour of monogamy»24, sanc-
tioning the husband is the head of the wife.
While commenting on the evolution of the institution of marriage, Besant
quotes Blackstone’s famous «Commentaries on the Laws of England», from which
she highlights the three absolute rights corresponding to every Englishman. The
first of them is the legal and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life. The second abso-
lute right of man is personal liberty, and finally, the third is property. Taking these
three inalienable rights into consideration, Besant seeks to «show that a married
woman is deprived of these rights by the mere fact of her marriage»25. As regards the
first right Blackstone states, Besant argues that «by marriage a woman loses her legal
existence»26. Actually, law does not grant her any recognition. By marriage, man
and woman are supposed to be united as one person, and consequently, «the very
being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage»27. Besant
argues that since husband and wife are one person, there is only one remaining, that
of the husband. The wife’s body, her reputation, and by extension, her persona, are
no longer of her own. The law does not recognise her except «under the cover of her
husband’s suit»28, and as a consequence, she becomes incompetent to give evidence
in criminal cases. Nevertheless, Besant argues that the husband does not benefit
from the situation either since «he thereby becomes responsible, to a great extent,
for his wife’s misdoings»29.
3.2. MARRIED WOMEN’S LACK OF RIGHTS: LEGAL EXISTENCE, PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND
PROPERTY
As regards the first of the men’s rights stated by Blackstone, Besant defends
that «a married woman is not protected by the laws in the ‘interrupted enjoyment’
of her limbs, her body and her reputation»30, since, again, she depends on her hus-
band. As Besant states, in case a woman is damaged in any way, «she is not a dam-
aged person; in the eye of the law, she is a piece of damaged property, and the
23 Ibidem, p. 7.
24 Ibidem.
25 Ibidem, p. 8.
26 Ibidem.
27 Ibidem.
28 Ibidem.
29 Ibidem, p. 9.
30 Ibidem.
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compensation is to be made to her owner»31. In case anyone receives a married
woman into his or her house without the permission of her husband, he or she
becomes liable to damages to him. Besant also refers to a case which she terms as
peculiarly disgusting. In case a wife is unfaithful to her husband, he cannot only get
a divorce but he is also able of claiming a money payment from the seducer «to
make up for the damage he has sustained by losing his wife’s services»32. In the case
the girl is unmarried and under age, she is considered to be the property of her
father, and correspondingly, the father, again, can interpose an action «against her
seducer for the loss of his daughter’s services»33. In any case, it seems it is the male
owner who can claim his rights as reparation of the damages he has suffered. In case
the wife separates from her husband, she remains unprotected by law, and conse-
quently, has no remedy for injury «unless by the doubtful plan of using her husband’s
name without his consent»34. Besant argues that a separated wife is almost literally
in a state of outlawry. She states a separate wife is unable to enter a contract since
she has no means of enforcing it, she is destitute of civil rights, she is liable to every
injustice, and ultimately, she can be wronged in all ways.
Besant also refers to a married woman’s control over her own body. She
states that a married woman’s body «belongs to her owner, not to herself»35. Actu-
ally, possible violence on the part of the husband in conjugal relations is unregu-
lated by law. Consequently, the married woman may be suffering ill, and she cannot
redress her situation. As Besant defends, «force or constraint is recognised by the
law as rape, in all cases save that of marriage»36, and so, no rape can be committed
by a husband causing any offence in the eyes of the law, «for the wife is the husband’s
property, and by marriage she has lost the right of control over her own body»37.
Besant even claims that it is by common law that the husband is able to inflict
corporal punishment onto his wife, despite the fact this right has been restricted.
Blackstone, in his «Commentaries», states that «the husband also (by old law) might
give his wife moderate correction. For as he is to answer for her misbehavior, the law
thought it reasonable to entrust him with this power of restraining her, by domestic
chastisement, in the same moderation that a man is allowed to correct his appren-
tices or children»38.
As regards the second right of men stated by Blackstone, that of personal
liberty, Besant states that a married woman has no such right, since the confine-
ment of a person, in any case, is an imprisonment. Besant quotes Blackstone when
he states «the courts of law will still permit a husband to restrain his wife of her
31 Ibidem, p. 10.
32 Ibidem, p. 11.
33 Ibidem.
34 Ibidem.
35 Ibidem, p. 19.
36 Ibidem, p. 12.
37 Ibidem.
38 Ibidem.
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liberty, in case of any gross misbehavior»39. Besant asks the readers the question
whether any man would admit that, under similar circumstances, a wife should
have legal power to deprive her husband of liberty. If not, Besant states, there is no
reason in justice why the husband should be permitted to exercise this right.
In relation to Blackstone’s third right, that of property, Besant claims it has
no existence for married women. In this particular case, unmarried women have no
ground to argue since she states that the «a femme sole may own real or personal
estate, by, sell, give, contract, sue, and be sued, just as though she were of the ‘wor-
thier blood’; it is marriage that, like felony and insanity, destroys her capability as
proprietor»40. The liberty as regards propriety that an unmarried woman possesses
disappears once she gets married. Besant lists different instances that illustrate how
the wife’s status as a proprietor is significantly diminished by the sanction of mar-
riage. According to Common Law, «whatever personal property belonged to the
wife before marriage is by marriage absolutely vested in the husband»41. Moreover,
the possessions the husband may have at the moment of his death pass on to his
heirs or anyone he chooses by will, instead of his wife. If a wife possesses lands, they
are not hers, but her husband’s, and consequently, after her husband’s death, even if
she survives him, she is deprived of the lands. Accordingly, Besant concludes that
«marriage, to a man, is regarded as a kind of lucrative business»42.
Since the common law, as regards women’s property was particularly sub-
jected to reprobation, Besant concedes that the wealthy devised some methods to
escape it through the so-called «marriage settlements», which women contracted
out of law. For woman’s property to be settled on herself, as it were, the woman
should be treated as incapable, and consequently, her property did not remain in
her own power, but it was vested in trustees for her own use, since, if in any case, the
property was received by the wife, it was possible for the husband to take it. As
Besant states, «the moment it [woman’s property] came into her possession it ceased
to be hers»43. Another initiative was attempted to protect women’s money in their
own hands by parliamentary interference, which resulted in a Bill to amend the
laws in relation to married women’s property introduced in the House of Com-
mons. As Mr. Russell Gurney stated, during the second reading of the Bill (April
14, 1869), «it is not proposed that, for the first time in our history, the property of
one half of the married people of this country should receive the protection of the
law»44. In seconding the motion, as regards the current law of property, Mr.Jessel
stated in his speech that «the existing law is a relic of slavery, and the House is now
asked to abolish the last remains of slavery in England»45.
39 Ibidem, p. 13.
40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem.
42 Ibidem, p. 14.
43 Ibidem, p. 16.
44 Ibidem.
45 Ibidem.
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3.3. NEW LAWS INTRODUCED
As a consequence of the Acts of 1870 and 1873, Besant states many im-
provements were enacted for the benefit of married women’s property, «although
much yet remains to be done»46. By the Act of 1870, married women were enabled
to deposit money «in the saving’s banks in their own names»47, among other benefi-
cial dispositions such as holding property inherited, or even, being liable for main-
taining their husbands and children under some circumstances. In the Act of 1873,
women were enabled to recover the debts they had contracted before marriage.
Despite the still inadequacy of these laws to place married women in a just position,
Besant describes these Acts as «a step in the right direction»48. Nevertheless, she
further discusses that a married woman may sue, but she cannot possibly be dues
without joining her husband, which involves, as Besant states, that «non-liability to
be sued means non-existence of credit»49.
In any case, the main principle of English law remained inalterable, that is,
a married woman was unable to hold property. At this point, Besant goes even
further and states that «married women share incapacity to manage property with
minors and lunatics; minors, lunatics, and married women are taken care of by
trustees; minors become of age, lunatics often recover, married women remain inca-
pable during the whole of their married life»50. Another fact that derives from a
married woman’s incapability of holding property of her own is that, in general
terms, she is unable of making a will «unless by virtue of a power reserved to her, or
of a marriage settlement, or with her husband’s assent or it may be by her to carry
her separate estate»51. In any case, it seems plausible that a husband is legally justi-
fied to will away from his wife her property, whereas a wife is unable to will away
her own, unless this right has especially been reserved to her. As a result, Annie
Besant reaches the conclusion that «the rights of every Englishman are destroyed in
women by marriage»52.
3.4. DISABILITIES DERIVED FROM MARRIAGE
Subsequently, not only does Besant claim that the rights of men are not
contemplated in the case of women, but she also refers to the multiple disabilities
that arise from this neglect. As regards legal disabilities, a married woman cannot be
46 Ibidem, p. 17.
47 Ibidem.
48 Ibidem, p. 18.
49 Ibidem.
50 Ibidem, p. 19.
51 «Commentaries on the Laws of England», BROOM and HADLEY, vol. III, pp. 427-428,
quoted in A. Besant, op. cit., p. 20.
52 BESANT, op. cit., p. 20.
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released from prison by her recognisances, as any prisoner can be, because of the
fact «she is incapable of becoming bail or giving her own recognisances»53. As a
married woman, and thus incapable of holding property, she cannot «enter into the
necessary recognisances to pay costs in the case of conviction»54. As for business
matters, the married woman is again placed in troubled waters, since, as Besant
claims, she is termed incapable of making a contract. If the married woman takes a
house without the husband’s consent, the landlord may reject the contract. In case
she tries to purchase, she cannot be sued for non-payment unless the husband acts
as a defendant, and consequently, she is granted no credit. If she is cheated, she
cannot sue, except in the cases mentioned in the Acts. Furthermore, Besant also
contemplates the difficulties a married woman may undergo in case she decides to
separate and attempt a living of her own. Besant claims that the separated woman
«is constantly pained and annoyed by the marriage-fetter, which hinders her activ-
ity and checks her efforts to make her way»55, and as a consequence, the only careers
that are open for married women are authorship and servitude.
In any case, Besant also refers to the presumable «advantages» that may
derive of the marriage laws. Besant quotes Broom and Hadley’s dispositions relating
to married women’s crimes: «if a woman commits theft, or burglary, by the coercion
of her husband, or even in his company, [...] she is dispunishable, being considered
to have acted by compulsion, and not of her own will»56. As a consequence, of this
alleged advantage in favour of women, Besant questions «it is hard to see what
advantage society gains by this curious fashion of reckoning married women as
children or lunatics»57. By contrast, numerous advantages arise for the criminal
husband such as the fact that the wife cannot be punished for concealing her hus-
band from justice, but a husband cannot possibly conceal his wife under the same
circumstances. As a result, Besant concludes that «any advantage which married
women may possess through the supposition that they are acting under the coer-
cion of their husbands ought to be summarily taken away from them»58. Ironically,
Besant adds that the fact that criminals may escape justice because of the mere fact
they happen to be married women will not aid in contributing to the safety of
society.
In order to redress the wrongs related to property that a married woman
may suffer, Besant advocates the necessity to pass an Act of Parliament defending
that «marriage shall in no fashion alter the civil status of a woman, that she shall
have over property the same rights as though she were unmarried, and shall, in all
civil and criminal matters, be held as responsible as though she were a femme sole»59.
53 Ibidem.
54 Ibidem.
55 Ibidem, p. 21.
56 Ibidem, p. 22.
57 Ibidem.
58 Ibidem, p. 23.
59 Ibidem, p. 24.
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Likewise, Besant claims marriage should no longer affect the position of women or
involve any legal disabilities. Moreover, marital control should be vanished and the
institution of marriage should be conceived as «a contract between equals, and not
as a bond between master and servant»60.
Farther in the text, Besant alludes to the different reasons raised by those
who oppose the idea that a woman should not be deprived of her property on
marriage. Besant refers to the smooth legal systems of other countries where mar-
riage does not entail women’s forfeiture. Moreover, she also defends that, if mar-
riage was no so solely based on the transaction of property, it would become «the
highest order of durable and happy attachments»61, since the affection that would
unite both sexes would be based on the «genuine friendship which only exists be-
tween equals in privileges as in faculties»62. To her mind, married women’s depriva-
tion of their property only contributes to the unhappiness caused by the husband’s
«tendency to tyranise»63, which arises out of the authority that marriage laws grant
him.
As Besant continues, in any case, «no grown person should be under the
arbitrary power of another»64. Maturity inevitably brings the need for self-support,
which married women cannot possibly gain, since their presumed helplessness and
dependence render them perpetual minors. In this respect, Besant makes reference
to an article from the Westminster Review (July, 1874), where the author questions:
Would it not, to begin with, be well to instruct girls that weakness, cowardice, and
ignorance, cannot constitute at once the perfection of womankind and the
imperfection of mankind? It is time to do away with the oak and the ivy ideal, and
to teach each plant to grow strong and self-supporting. Perfect quality would,
under this system, be found in the home, and mutual respect and deference would
replace the alternate coaxing and commandment now too often seen. Equal rights
would abolish both tyranny and rebellion; there would be more courtesy in the
husband, more straightforwardness in the wife. Then, indeed, would there be some
hope of generally happy marriages65.
taking these premises into consideration, Besant argues that, until social and legal
equality between the sexes becomes the basis of marriage, «the truest love, the truest
sympathy, the truest happiness in it, will be the exception rather than the rule, and
the real value of this relation, domestic and social, will be fatally missed»66. Besant
even argues that marriages, under this law, often contribute to the promotion of
unhappiness.
60 Ibidem.
61 Ibidem, p. 26.
62 Ibidem.
63 Ibidem.
64 Ibidem.
65 Ibidem.
66 Ibidem, p. 27.
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Subsequently, Besant refers to the wrongs the mother may suffer under the
marriage laws. She declares that the unmarried woman has a claim over her child,
while the married woman has none, since her husband is given the custody of the
child until it reaches the age of sixteen. Moreover, the father’s custody over his
legitimate children is complete, whereas the mother has no right over them as against
his, that is, the husband can easily take his children from his wife and even place
them in the care of a different woman, while his former wife cannot redress. The
father can also appoint a guardian for his children in his will, and the surviving
mother cannot do anything to alter the situation. In case the parents hold differing
religious beliefs, the children are brought up in that of the father. As a result, Besant
argues that «the married woman has no rights over her own children; she bears
them, nurses them, toils for them, watches over them, and may then have them
torn from her»67. In any case, despite the highly respected woman’s sphere and her
duty in the home, Besant states that «the law has no reverence for the tie between
mother and child, and ignores every claim of the mother who is also a wife»68. In
this respect, the unmarried mother is in a better position than the married mother,
since the former has «an absolute right to the custody of her own children»69, while
the maternal tie seems to blur once the legal contract of marriage has taken effect.
3.5. ADVANTAGES OF UNMARRIED WOMEN
In general terms, Besant ascertains that marriage presents direct disadvan-
tages for women. Unmarried women preserve their natural rights; they control their
actions, their body and their property; they receive protection from all courts; they
maintain her independence and they only owe obedience to the laws. In case a child
is born out of wedlock, unmarried women maintain all rights over it. Nevertheless,
Besant points out two advantages affecting unmarried women. Firstly, an unmar-
ried woman is made to face social disapprobation, and secondly, children born
from unlegalised unions do not hold the same rights as those born from married
couples. As a consequence, Besant concludes that both legal and unlegalised unions
have disadvantages, but «these evils are, however, overwhelmingly greater on the
side of the disabilities imposed on women by marriage»70. Besant even adds that:
So great are these [disadvantages] that no wise and self-respecting woman should,
with her eyes open, enter into a contract of marriage while the laws remain as they
are, and no man who really honors a woman should ask her to subject herself to
the disadvantages imposed on the English wife, or should ask her to take him as
literally her master and owner. The relative position is as dishonouring to the man
67 Ibidem, p. 28.
68 Ibidem.
69 Ibidem.
70 Ibidem, p. 29.
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as it is insulting to the woman, and good men revolt against it as hotly as do the
most high-spirited women71.
Furthermore, Besant proposes different courses of action for those who aim
at establishing «a healthier and purer sexual morality»72. In her view, the first action
that should be taken should be to promote a reform of the marriage laws by passing
an Act of Parliament, and she even speaks of a Marriage Reform League to organise
such petition. This legal determination should be accompanied by the resolute pur-
pose of not contracting legal marriages as long as these marriage laws regulate legalised
unions. One of the major changes that Besant defends is that, in the new legal
contracts of marriage, the law «should interfere just as far as it does in other con-
tracts, and no further; [since] the law has no right to dictate the terms of the mar-
riage contract»73, but it is the contracting parties who should arrange their affairs as
they wish. In addition to this plea for autonomy, Besant also defends the reform
should regulate the position of children. The new law should «impose the full dis-
charge of the responsibilities of parents towards those to whom they have given
life»74. Moreover, Besant also claims no marriage should be contracted by minors.
In any case, it is claimed that the purpose of this needed reform should be devised
«to substitute for the present semi-barbarous laws a scheme which shall be sober,
dignified, and practicable, and which shall recognise the vital interest of the com-
munity in the union of those who are to be the parents of the next generation»75.
In this respect, as a kind of drawback, Besant contemplates that, under no
legal force, «a libertine»76 may decide to desert his wife and children taking advan-
tage of this unusual situation unregulated by law. In that case, Besant argue that
men like that would have acted in the same way if the form of marriage contracted
had no legal binding force, and thus, she defends marriage should be legally biding
to oblige men to support children. Nevertheless, Besant repeats that if this legal
union must necessarily involve the disability of the married woman, an unlegalised
union should be preferred, since «there is as many an unhappy woman who would
be only too glad if the libertine who has legally married her would desert her, and
leave her, even with the burden of a family, to make herself and her children»77.
In any case, Besant concludes the first part of this volume by reaffirming
that a reform is necessary, directly addressing the legally married men and women
to lead the march, since they are «happy in their marriages —yet feel the immorality
of the law, and desire to see it changed»78. She is convinced that «the advocacy of
71 Ibidem.
72 Ibidem.
73 Ibidem, p. 30.
74 Ibidem.
75 Ibidem.
76 Ibidem, p. 31.
77 Ibidem.
78 Ibidem.
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change in the marriage laws does not mean the abolition of the home»79, but the
improvement of women’s situation in marriage.
3.6. DIVORCE
Through the second part of this volume, Annie Besant deals with the ques-
tion of divorce. She argues that marriage differs from any other contract in the
difficulty of its dissolution, mainly because it is more often viewed as a religious
bond rather than as a civil contract. Consequently, when the Reformers advocated
divorce, it was considered a heresy. In England, different instances gradually brought
about the acceptance of divorce under particular conditions. In principle, divorce
remained under the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts until the reign of Edward VI.
However, his death repelled the proposed reform based on the remodelling of the
marriage laws. In 1701, Besant refers to the passing of one bill enabling a petitioner
to remarry. Almost a century later, in 1798, Lord Loughborough’s «Orders» became
effective. Much later, in 1857, an Act was finally passed establishing a Court for
Divorce and Matrimonial Causes. This court was enabled to grant judicial separa-
tion in cases of «cruelty, desertion for two years and upwards, or adultery on the
part of the husband»80.
Besant argues that the divorce laws should undergo reformation. In her
view, «the first reform here needed is that husband and wife should be placed on a
perfect equality in asking for a divorce»81. The present law permitted that, provided
husband and wife lived together, a husband can keep «as many mistresses as he will,
and [...] he is perfectly safe from any suit for dissolution of marriage»82. Moreover,
Besant claims that «adultery alone, when committed by the husband, is not ground
for dissolution of marriage»83 since it must involve any other additional offence. On
the other hand, the husband can obtain the dissolution of marriage for adultery. As
a consequence, Besant claims «the system of judicial separation should be entirely
swept away»84, and thus, whenever divorce is granted, its derived effects should be
absolute. Besant also lists the possible causes that may lead to a case of divorce,
which are adultery, cruelty and habitual drunkenness, while making no differences
according to sex.
As a general rule, Besant is in favour of the dissolution of marriage and
justifies it by stating «how utterly wrong and foolish it is to promise for life that
which can never be controlled by the will»85. Moreover, she also argues that «a
79 Ibidem, p. 32.
80 Ibidem, p. 34.
81 Ibidem.
82 Ibidem.
83 Ibidem.
84 Ibidem, p. 35.
85 Ibidem, p. 41.
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husband and a wife ought to continue so long united as they love each other»86, and
so, an easier dissolution of marriage would ensure the existence of true married
partners, since their union would certainly be based on the true essence of the
institution. Besant states at this point that «prostitution lies in the union of the
sexes without mutual love»87, and therefore, if divorce was more easily obtained,
«the majority of marriages will be far happier than they are now»88, since their
union would be based on «a bond of kindliness, thoughtfulness, and actual helpful-
ness»89.
On the other hand, Besant argues that there may be those who claim that,
if divorce might be so easy to obtain, it would be better not to marry at all. Besant
defends that marriage is desirable since it is a legal written contract which grants
children the necessary protection. Moreover, Besant discusses that though «love is
essential to true and holy marriage, marriage implies more than love; it implies also
a number of new relations to the outside world which [...] cannot be wholly disre-
garded»90. In addition, Besant emphasises the need of marriage as a contract desir-
able for the sake of children. Although she also remarks that «if all men and women
were perfect, no contract would be necessary»91 to secure protection and stability.
Besant is well aware of the way marriage and its subsequent dissolution may affect
children. She states that «in all cases of divorce the interests of the children should
be carefully guarded»92. Nevertheless, she concedes that there exists common un-
fairness as regards the arrangements that permit parents’ access to their children,
especially in the case of adulterous mothers.
3.7. FAMILY PLANNING AND BIRTH CONTROL
Well aware of the position of children in a faulty marriage and the over-
whelming increase of the population of the time, two years before, Annie Besant
had collaborated in the publication of Charles Knowlton’s famous volume The Fruits
of Philosophy, which mainly copes with family planning and birth-restrictions. It is
in the third chapter that Knowlton refers to four main methods by means of which
women can control their sexuality. Firstly, women should be aware of the fact their
fertility is more prominent in some periods of time over others. Secondly, Dr.
Knowlton refers to the preventive check, which consisted in the use of an ordinary
syringe after intercourse. Thirdly, he quotes Carlile’s advice, included in «Every
Woman’s Book», asserting that the use of a fine sponge at the end of the vagina
86 Ibidem.
87 Ibidem, p. 42.
88 Ibidem, p. 43.
89 Ibidem, p. 44.
90 Ibidem, p. 48.
91 Ibidem.
92 Ibidem, p. 36.
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should prevent impregnation. As a doctor, Knowlton even refers to popular meth-
ods to prevent conception which are ineffective, such as the belief that the long
persistence in nursing a baby would prevent contraception. Finally, he mentions
another method of contraception, regarded as criminal, which is the procuring of
abortion.
In any case, Besant believes that «just as true marriage is invaluable, so is
unreal marriage deteriorating in its effects»93. Consequently, if man and woman are
enabled to be freed from their injuring union and are allowed to seek for fit part-
ners, in their new happy marriages, they will become «joyful servants of humanity,
worthy parents of the citizens of tomorrow»94, that is, «free instead of enslaved,
bound by love instead of by law»95. Annie Besant’s remarkable contributions and
theories as regards women’s situation, birth control, the need for reform of the
marriage laws, and the broadening of the cases of legal divorce guarantee her status
as one of the most outstanding defenders of women’s cause at the fin-de-siècle.
4. CONCLUSIONS
Annie Besant’s contribution and involvement is significant to the extent it
renders Victorian idealisations and conceptualisations of sexuality and married life
more intricate, thus disrupting later assumed and perceived notions of Victorian
prudery modernists entertained with regard to the period. Moreover, the transfor-
mation her ideas and notions underwent throughout her career, from her Evangeli-
cal background, through her feminist endeavours and her final Teosophical phase,
defines her as a complex figure, representative of the intricacy and richness of a
period of contrasts. As Jeffreys points out, Besant moved from a background of
social prudery to becoming an advocate and practitioner of free love, and eventu-
ally, as a convert to teosophy, Besant became a most energetic proponent of celibacy
and psychic love, avoiding sexual intercourse to evade damaging the so-called higher
self. Her situation as a middle-class Victorian woman renders her in an awkward
position, moving through the borders of Victorian femininity to challenge assumed
notions of prudery in order to attain social goals for women shifting from a private
to a public sphere. Precedent outstanding female figures had advocated for im-
provements in women’s situation, but never dared defend contraception as a real
and attainable measure to exert control over their sexuality. Male voices had drawn
attention to the overflowing situation of population, and the consequent need for
food supply but refused taking measures that opposed the cultural ethos of the
time. Consequently, despite the fact some female and male voices had already raised
the issue of women’s question, what mostly rendered Besant’s work remarkably note-
93 Ibidem, p. 51.
94 Ibidem.
95 Ibidem, p. 52.
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worthy was her concern as a woman to bring intimate and private issues of contra-
ception and birth-control to public exposure and discussion, thus subverting the
politics of separate spheres, protecting wives and mothers from invisibility in mar-
ried life, and granting women the opportunity to exert some control over their
sexuality, rescuing them from their dependent situation and enabling them to take
control over their own lives. Despite Besant’s often raised marginalisation in Victo-
rian times, one cannot help but notice how representative she is of the intricacies
and complexity of an age of contrasts, which has only been discovered fairly re-
cently within a postmodern and Neo-victorian look into the the mirror of the Vic-
torian past.
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